A new study published by the Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, authored by researcher Walid Abdel Hai, analyzes the future of Iran's nuclear program and identifies four main scenarios for its trajectory. The study concludes that the "nuclear threshold" scenario is considered the most likely outcome for Iran's program in the coming years.
The study states that abandoning a strategic project like the nuclear program, in which Iran has invested for decades, could be interpreted internally as a political and strategic retreat. Elites supporting the program view it as a key element of power and deterrence against external pressures, according to the study. This situation, the study notes, grants Tehran multiple gains by maintaining important strategic power cards and keeping adversaries in doubt, while avoiding the repercussions of declaring nuclear weapon possession. "This option also gives Iran greater negotiating power in confronting the United States and Western powers, as the nuclear program becomes a pressure card used by Tehran in political, economic, and security files," the study says. It suggests this path could become more attractive if external threat levels rise or if the Iranian leadership believes nuclear weapons are the sole guarantee for regime survival. The study indicates that a segment of the Iranian elite sees the North Korean experience as proof that nuclear weapons can offer effective deterrence. However, the study warns that this scenario carries significant risks, including potential widespread military attacks on Iran or prompting other regional powers to seek nuclear weapons, which could trigger an arms race in the Middle East.
Four Future Scenarios Explored
The study outlines four potential scenarios for the Iranian nuclear program, though it ultimately excludes the possibility of its complete abandonment. The first scenario involves Iran abandoning or dismantling its nuclear program, a highly improbable outcome with a probability estimated between 5 and 10 percent. The study states, "The study considers that abandoning a strategic project that Iran has invested in for decades may be interpreted internally as a political and strategic retreat, and that the elites supporting the nuclear program see it as one of the most important elements of power and deterrence in the face of external pressures."
The second scenario, deemed the "nuclear threshold," involves Iran maintaining its technical and scientific capabilities without officially producing a nuclear bomb. This is considered the most likely outcome, with a probability between 60 and 65 percent until 2030. The study explains, "This situation grants Tehran multiple gains, as it maintains important strategic power cards, keeps its adversaries in a state of doubt and uncertainty, and at the same time avoids the political, legal, and military repercussions that may result from declaring possession of a nuclear weapon." It adds that "This option also gives Iran greater negotiating power in confronting the United States and Western powers, as the nuclear program becomes a pressure card used by Tehran in political, economic, and security files." The study suggests this path could become more attractive if "external threat levels rise, or if the Iranian leadership is convinced that possessing nuclear weapons is the only guarantee for the survival of the regime and the prevention of any military intervention against the country." A segment of the Iranian elite views the North Korean experience as evidence that nuclear weapons can provide an effective deterrence umbrella against major powers, according to the study. However, the study warns, "this scenario carries significant risks, most notably the possibility of Iran being subjected to widespread military attacks, or pushing other regional powers to seek possession of nuclear weapons, which would open the door to an unprecedented arms race in the Middle East."
The third scenario projects Iran officially possessing nuclear weapons, thereby becoming the tenth nuclear state. The probability of this occurring is estimated between 35 and 40 percent.
The study concludes by stating, "The future of the Iranian nuclear program appears to be governed by a delicate equation that combines deterrence, ambiguity, and political bargaining, pending the developments that will emerge from regional and international developments in the coming years."
Key Drivers of Program Direction
US and Israeli pressures will remain the most influential factors in determining the direction of Iran's nuclear program in the coming years. This persistent external pressure is anticipated to shape Tehran's decisions regarding its nuclear capabilities. The Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, in its recent study, posits that while Iran maintains its technical and scientific capacities, the level and nature of these pressures will largely dictate how the program evolves. The study notes that the perceived threat from the United States and Israel could either reinforce Iran's commitment to a nuclear threshold scenario, where it possesses the ability to quickly develop nuclear weapons without officially doing so, or potentially push it toward overt weaponization if leaders believe it is the only viable deterrent.
The continuous scrutiny and potential actions from Washington and Jerusalem serve as a significant variable in Iran's strategic calculations. The study suggests that Iran's leadership will weigh these external dynamics against its internal political and security considerations. The balance between maintaining strategic ambiguity, gaining negotiating leverage, and avoiding direct military confrontation is heavily influenced by the stance and policies of these two nations. Should the perceived threat intensify, the inclination within Iran to advance its program further could grow, especially among those who view nuclear capabilities as essential for national security and regime survival. Conversely, sustained diplomatic engagement or de-escalation efforts from the US and Israel could create different incentives for Tehran, though the study emphasizes that the core objective of maintaining a strong nuclear infrastructure is unlikely to be abandoned.
Implications and Strategic Gains
Iran is closer than ever to becoming a "latent nuclear state", according to the Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations. This status implies that Tehran possesses the technical and scientific capabilities to rapidly produce a nuclear weapon if its leadership decides to do so, without officially declaring possession. This proximity to weaponization grants Iran significant strategic advantages, including enhanced deterrence against external threats and increased negotiating leverage in international relations. The study notes that maintaining this ambiguous position allows Iran to keep adversaries uncertain about its intentions and capabilities.
The study also considered a fourth scenario, described as a "black swan" event. This category encompasses unexpected developments that are difficult to anticipate but could have a substantial impact on the trajectory of Iran's nuclear program. Such events, by their nature, could drastically alter regional dynamics or international perceptions, potentially forcing a re-evaluation of Iran's nuclear strategy or accelerating its timeline towards either overt weaponization or a different diplomatic path. The Zaytouna Center noted the inherent unpredictability of these events, making them challenging to quantify in terms of likelihood but significant in their potential effect.
